Reuters reports the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has begun inspecting all its equipment for “evidence of explosives.” If accurate, that’s a fascinating but understandable reaction — scrutinizing not just communication equipment and other electronic devices but all equipment, including vehicles and, I suspect, ammunition stocks.
Why the panicked mass response by the heavily armed Iranian military and intelligence organization that represses the Iranian people, supports and supplies Iran’s proxy armies and routinely vows to destroy Israel and America?
Credit Israel’s ingenious wireless pager-delivered “discretely targeted simultaneous mass bombing attack” on personnel in Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy terrorist militia, on Sept. 17.
Austin Bay
If “discrete” and “mass” appear to be contradictory, they are descriptively contradictory.
Hezbollah leaders decided to use pagers to alert personnel since Israel monitors more sophisticated cellphones. Somewhere in the pager supply chain, Israeli personnel inserted a detonator and small amount of explosive into each device. A coded message from Israeli operatives turned the pagers into small grenades.
Death in disguise. Michael Doran of the Hudson Institute called the devices a “Trojan Horse for the digital age.” He also dubbed the explosive-laden pagers “Grim Beepers.” Give Doran kudos for graveyard wit.
Hezbollah has been at war with Israel since the 1980s, conducts terror attacks and is currently bombarding Israel with rockets, missiles and artillery rounds. Like Hamas, Hezbollah terrorists use human shields — they hide among civilians.
A Hezbollah militiaman carrying a pager linked to senior Hezbollah commanders is a terrorist leader at some level — a very legitimate target.
Published casualty figures are iffy. It appears the attack killed over three dozen and injured around 3,500. Some of the killed and wounded weren’t Hezbollah fighters — but the vast majority were. Two-thousand-pound aircraft bombs are far less discrete when they explode. Entire city blocks become craters.
It seems an explosive pager wounded Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon. That’s hard evidence that he was in Hezbollah’s command and control network. Grim Beeper pagers detonated in Damascus, Syria. IRGC officers and Hezbollah thugs operate in Syria. No doubt they thought they were safe.
Which leads to another attack target: trust among Hezbollah personnel. Senior leaders gave the killer pagers to their subordinates. A day later several Hezbollah radios exploded — more remotely detonated Trojan horses. Can Hezbollah fighters trust their commanders? Even fanatics can have morale problems.
Discretely targeted simultaneous mass bombing attack. Meshing “discrete” and “mass” is an oxymoron — a figure of speech combining apparently contradictory words. I recall my fourth-grade teacher said “bittersweet” was an oxymoron.
The Grim Beeper attack was very discrete — the intimate targeting of terrorist commanders and tactical leaders. But it was also a near-simultaneous mass attack striking targets over a wide area in Lebanon and Syria.
For at least three decades, military analysts have been warning that we could face a massive cyberattack that simultaneously shuts down communications nodes, power-generating facilities and computer-controlled transportation infrastructure.
This attack scenario dates from 2008. Digital malware infects a dam’s computer system and takes control of the supervisory operating system. The infected computer opens the dam’s gates, creating a destructive flood. The malware breaches the dam with plausibly deniable finesse, rather than the traceable mess left by a high explosive bomb.
Booby traps are as old as warfare. The Trojan horse was booby trapped with Greek soldiers. Malay mancatchers and punji sticks kill quite effectively, if you run into them in the jungle. A poisoned desert well is a booby trap. Anticipating thirsty GIs, retreating Wehrmacht troops booby trapped French wine bottles.
In Vietnam the CIA and Special Forces booby trapped North Vietnamese Army rifle bullets and mortar shells — Project Eldest Son (1967-69). Green Berets seeded NVA ammo boxes with exploding bullets and shells. The shells would explode and wound or kill NVA soldiers. The operation targeted personnel and NVA morale.
But these discrete booby traps were not simultaneous mass attacks over a wide area.
Now the IRGC is inspecting all its equipment. Vehicles have batteries that could explode on command. The ammo may be sabotaged. “Paging Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Paging Ayatollah Khamenei.”
To find out more about Austin Bay and read features by other Creators writers and cartoonists, visit the Creators Syndicate webpage at www.creators.com.
